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IF ESTABLISHED BY LAW, THEN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IS AN OFFICER
Jennifer L. Cotton
Administrative Judges (AJs) are a large and often
overlooked group of federal agency adjudicators. While
courts have examined Article II Appointments Clause
challenges to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), courts
have yet to encounter a legal challenge to the
constitutionality of AJs’ appointment procedures. The
constitutionality of any federal government actor’s
appointment is dependent upon whether that actor is an
“officer” or an “employee” under the Article II
Appointments clause. It is apparent that the current
“significant authority” test that the Supreme Court has
espoused to distinguish between officers and employees
is unworkable. This Note endeavors to set forth a brightline test to distinguish between officers and employees
that better serves the purposes of the Appointments
Clause and is more easily applicable. The test is simple:
if an AJ is “established by Law,” then that AJ is an
officer and must be appointed according to the
Appointments Clause.



J.D. Candidate, University of Georgia School of Law, 2019; B.A., New York University,
2016. I would like to thank Professor Kent Barnett and the Georgia Law Review Editorial
Board for their help in developing and editing this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is possible that thousands of federal agency adjudicators in the
United States today have been unconstitutionally appointed. The
constitutionality of their appointment depends upon whether they
are officers or mere employees. While the Article II Appointments
Clause of the United States Constitution sets forth black-letter
requirements for the appointment of officers, it sets forth none for
employees.1 Despite its apparent importance, the distinction
between officers and employees under the Article II Appointments
Clause is murky. Several recent cases have concerned challenges to
the appointment of the most visible group of agency adjudicators—
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs).2 This Note considers a much
larger but often overlooked group, collectively referred to as nonALJs or Administrative Judges (AJs). This Note will argue for a
rule-based approach to determining whether AJs qualify as officers
under the Appointments Clause, and will contend that courts
should employ a bright-line rule to determine AJs’ officer status: if
their positions are “established by Law,”3 then they are officers.
The “hidden judiciary” of federal administrative adjudication is
composed of ALJs and their “doppelgängers,” AJs.4 When this Note
uses the term “AJs,” it refers to all federal administrative
adjudicators who oversee evidentiary hearings, excluding ALJs.
Non-ALJ adjudicators go by many titles, including Administrative
Judges, Hearing Officers, and Immigration Judges,5 but for

1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
2 See infra Part II.
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4 Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2016)
(citation omitted); see also Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the ‘Hidden Judiciary’: How the Merit
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part I), 63 JUDICATURE 60, 62 (1979)
(coining the phrase “hidden judiciary”). But see Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the
Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 323 (2002) ("We [ALJs]
used to be referred to as the hidden judiciary; but you do not see that phraseology much any
more." (footnote omitted)).
5 See Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies:
Status, Selection Oversight, and Removal, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2019) (“Non-ALJs reported in
our survey go by 23 different titles.”).
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simplicity’s sake, this Note will refer to all of these non-ALJ
adjudicators as “AJs.”
The Supreme Court recently resolved a circuit split regarding
whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ALJs are
employees or officers, holding that the SEC ALJs are officers—not
employees.6 When the SEC ALJ circuit split developed, some
expressed concerns about the slippery slope that may result if all
ALJs were deemed to be officers.7 Equally concerning is the prospect
of finding that AJs are officers. While courts and scholars have
devoted significant attention to ALJs, regarding both their
appointment and independence, AJs have received relatively little
attention.8 This disparity in attention is likely due to the fact that
AJs are more amorphous than ALJs; data is not as readily available
as to their numbers, titles, qualifications, and protections.9 The
most recent study indicates that federal agencies employ at least
10,831 AJs in the United States today.10 This number towers above
the number of reported federal ALJs: 1,931.11 Some AJs might be
appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause’s provisions,
but if some AJs are officers—which this Note argues is the case—
then likely thousands of AJs have been and are being appointed
unconstitutionally.
First, this Note will examine the Appointments Clause, its
history, and related jurisprudence that is relevant to the employeeofficer distinction. After that, this Note will explain who AJs are,
particularly in relation to ALJs. Finally, this Note will argue that a
bright-line, “established by Law”12 test is the best route for
determining whether AJs are officers.
See Lucia v. SEC., 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018); see also infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1194 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J.,
dissenting) (“Under the majority’s reading of Freytag, all federal ALJs are at risk of being
declared inferior officers.”).
8 But see Helman v. Dep’t of Veteran Aff., 856 F.3d 920, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that
a Merit Systems Protection Board AJ’s appointment as a mere employee was
unconstitutional); Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 443, 464 (2018) (“Th[e] historic meaning of ‘officer’ would likely extend to thousands of
officials not currently appointed as Article II officers, such as . . . administrative judges.”).
9 See Barnett et al., supra note 5, at 13 (noting that the variety of non-ALJ hearings
“renders describing and analyzing them a challenge”). Numbers are as of March 2017.
10 Id. at 32.
11 Administrative Law Judges by Agency, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (Mar.
2017), https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-byAgency.
12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6
7
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II. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution delineates the
requirements for appointment of “Officers of the United
States” in the Article II Appointments Clause:[The
President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all . . .
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.13
The Clause contains two mechanisms of appointment—a default
mechanism for principal officers and an alternative mechanism for
inferior officers. The Clause makes clear that the President must
appoint principal officers with the Senate’s advice and consent;14
this is the default appointment mechanism. Alternatively, under
what is often referred to as the Excepting Clause,15 Congress may
vest the power to appoint inferior officers in the President, courts of
law, or heads of departments.16
The Clause includes the term “inferior Officers,”17 but it does not
explicitly name the officers who are not inferior. To distinguish
between “Officers of the United States” and “inferior Officers,” the
Supreme Court has dubbed officers who are not inferior as
“principal officers.”18 The Clause also does not explicitly name the
individuals who do not rise to officer status at all. Courts have
dubbed these individuals who work for the federal government—but
who are not “officers”—mere “employees.”19

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
15 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926) (“The phrase ‘But Congress
may by law vest’ is equivalent to ‘excepting that Congress may by law vest.’”).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
17 Id.
18 Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which Government Workers
Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 1148 (2011) (citing
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 668 (1988)).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1878) (distinguishing “officers of
the United States” from “agent[s] or employ[ees]”).
13
14
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The purposes of the Appointments Clause are manifold, largely
stemming from grounds of checks and balances. The Supreme Court
has said that the Clause generally protects against “the danger of
one branch’s aggrandizing its power at the expense of another
branch.”20 This purpose reflects a system of checks and balances
where neither Congress nor the President alone can create and fill
an office.21 The Clause was also crafted to prevent the
“‘manipulation of official appointments,’ . . . because ‘the power of
appointment to offices’ was deemed ‘the most insidious and powerful
weapon of eighteenth century despotism.’”22 The English Crown had
used “clever distribution of places and positions” to secure a “great
Chain of political Self-Interest” where “[t]he weeds of tyranny
flourished.”23 Seeking to evade this utilization of the appointment
power as a weapon, the Framers limited it to “ensure that those who
wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the
people,” and thus divided the power to appoint between the
Executive and Legislative Branches.24
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S PRE-LUCIA APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court has struggled to draw a clear line to
distinguish between principal and inferior officers, and between
inferior officers and employees. This Note will not examine the hazy
distinction between principal and inferior officers, as it is not
relevant to the issue of whether AJs are officers or employees. For
now, it will suffice to say that if AJs are officers, then they are
almost certainly inferior officers who can be appointed by the
alternative mechanism in the Appointments Clause.25
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (“The Framers regarded the
checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a selfexecuting safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.”).
22 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883 (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776–1787 79, 143 (1969)).
23 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 143 (1998
ed.).
24 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129–31).
25 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (holding that the individual at issue
was an “inferior officer” because, among other reasons, she was “subject to removal by a
higher Executive Branch official”). AJs are subordinate in the sense that they have superiors,
so under the Court’s analysis in Morrison, they are likely inferior officers. See also Edmond
20
21
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At the heart of this Note lies the distinction between officers and
employees—in other words, the line that divides “Officers of the
United States” who must be appointed in accordance with the
Appointments Clause, and mere employees whose appointment is
not governed by the Clause. To be clear, this Note will not ask how
to apply the line as defined by the Court. Instead, this Note will
argue what the line should be for AJs. Ultimately, this Note
contends that the line between officers and employees needs more
clarity, which is a goal that courts can reach by relying upon the
“established by Law” provision of the Appointments Clause for AJs.
First, though, it is important to walk through the Supreme
Court’s employee-officer jurisprudence thus far. The Court has used
varying factors for officer status over its history. In 1878, Justice
Miller reasoned in United States v. Germaine that a civil surgeon
appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions was not an officer
because he was not appointed by the President, a court of law, or a
department head.26 Courts and scholars have criticized this
reasoning as “circular,” because it asks how an individual was
appointed in order to determine whether the individual should have
been appointed that way.27 The inquiry should be the other way
around: one must first ask whether the individual is an officer in
order to determine how the individual should be appointed. The
Germaine court also looked to “the nature of [the civil surgeon]’s
employment.”28 It noted that the surgeon’s duties “are not
continuing and permanent, and they are occasional and
intermittent.”29 Scholars have criticized this tenure and duration
language as being both overinclusive and underinclusive.30 For
example, an office might exist temporarily,31 and an employee’s
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 622–63 (1997) (“Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends
on whether he has a superior.”).
26 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1878).
27 See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132–33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he earliest
Appointments Clause cases often employed circular logic, granting officer status to an official
based in part upon his appointment by the head of a department.”).
28 Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511.
29 Id. at 512.
30 See, e.g., E. Garrett West, Clarifying the Employee-Officer Distinction in Appointments
Clause Jurisprudence, 127 YALE L.J. F. 42, 48 (2017) (“[C]ontinuity alone does not distinguish
the two roles. Congress might create a temporary office, or a contract might extend
indefinitely.”).
31 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988) (noting that the independent
counsel’s position is “limited in tenure,” but that she “is an ‘inferior’ officer in the
constitutional sense”).
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position might be indefinite.32 Tenure and duration are not reliable
indicators of officer status.33
In 1920, Justice Brandeis stated in Burnap v. United States that
“[t]he distinction between officer and employee . . . does not rest
upon differences in the qualifications necessary to fill the positions
or in the character of the service to be performed,” but that the
difference is instead “determined by the manner in which Congress
has specifically provided for the creation of the several positions,
their duties and appointment thereto.”34 The Burnap court held that
a landscape architect appointed by the Office of Public Buildings
and Grounds was not an officer, but instead an employee.35 Justice
Brandeis emphasized the “established by Law” provision of the
Appointments Clause when he looked to whether Congress
established the position, duties, or appointment by law.36 Of course,
Congress’s establishing the appointment by law is a circular
indicator reminiscent of Germaine.37 But Justice Brandeis’s looking
to Congressional establishment of the position by law aligns with
this Note’s argument: that Congress’s statutory creation of AJs’
positions should be determinative of their officer status.
Modern employee-officer jurisprudence generally stems from
Buckley v. Valeo, the 1976 case in which the Court held that Federal
Election Commissioners were inferior officers rather than
employees.38 The Buckley court established today’s prevailing-yetvague test for officer status: “any appointee exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of
the United States’” and must be appointed according to the
Appointments Clause.39 In a footnote, the Court elaborated upon
this distinction by stating that “[e]mployees are lesser functionaries
subordinate to officers of the United States . . . , whereas the
Commissioners, appointed for a statutory term, are not subject to
the control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative
32 An example might be the thousands of administrative assistants across the federal
government.
33 But see Steven G. Bradbury, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the
Appointments Clause, 31 OP. O.L.C. 73, 77 (2007) (“[F]or a position to be a federal office, it
also must be ‘continuing’ . . . .”).
34 Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920).
35 Id. at 519.
36 Id. at 515.
37 See supra note 28.
38 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
39 Id.
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authority.”40 The Court has since used the “significant authority”
test as the touchstone for distinguishing employees from officers.41
But the “significant authority” test has proven difficult to apply,42
and it does not help to distinguish inferior officers from either
principal officers or employees.
Fifteen years after Buckley, the Court again grappled with the
employee-officer distinction in Freytag v. Commissioner.43 The
Court held that the individuals at issue—Special Trial Judges
(STJs) within the Tax Court—were inferior officers, not
employees.44 In doing so, the Freytag court fleshed out the
significant authority test by incorporating several factors. The
Court looked to whether the STJ office was “established by Law,”
and whether the STJs’ duties, salaries, and means of appointment
were specified by statute.45 Unlike Buckley, which did not cite
Burnap at all,46 the Freytag court looked to Burnap’s emphasis on
the “established by Law” provision to inform its decision.47 The
Freytag court also reasoned that although STJs lack authority to
render final decisions in all cases they hear, they perform “more
than ministerial tasks,” and instead “take testimony, conduct trials,
rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce
compliance with discovery orders.”48 The Court noted that “[i]n the
course of carrying out these important functions, the special trial
judges exercise significant discretion.”49 This was the first
articulation of such factors by the Court. The Court did not make
clear how important these factors are, or whether some are more
important than others. Finally, the Freytag court stated that “[e]ven
if the duties of [STJs] . . . were not as significant as we . . . have
found them to be, our conclusion would be unchanged” because the
chief judge of the Tax Court could assign STJs to render final
Id. at n.162.
See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (holding significance of
authority relevant when determining officer status); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881
(1991) (citing Buckley for “significant authority” test).
42 See infra Part II.B.
43 Freytag, 501 U.S. 868.
44 Id. at 881–82.
45 Id. at 881 (citing Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516–17 (1920); United States
v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1878)).
46 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (never mentioning Burnap).
47 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
48 Id. at 881–82.
49 Id. at 882.
40
41
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decisions in some proceedings, and STJs cannot be “inferior officers
for purposes of some of their duties . . . but mere employees with
respect to other responsibilities.”50 Lower courts have latched onto
these finality51 and discretion52 factors post-Freytag.
Prior to Lucia, the most recent Supreme Court case that
discussed the employee-officer distinction was Free Enterprise
Fund.53 The parties in Free Enterprise Fund conceded that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) members
were officers.54 The regulated parties argued that the Board
members were principal officers, but the Court had “no hesitation
in concluding” that the Board members were inferior officers
because they were supervised and directed, and thus subordinate.55
In his dissent, Justice Breyer did not take issue with the majority’s
distinction between principal and inferior officers, but instead
criticized the majority for failing to take this opportunity to clarify
the distinction between inferior officers and employees.56 Justice
Breyer listed positions the Court had held to be “officers” in the past,
including “a district court clerk, . . . an ‘assistant-surgeon[,]’ . . . a
‘cadet-engineer[,]’ . . . [and] election monitors.”57 Justice Breyer
contended that “the term’s sweep is unusually broad” and
recommended that the Court adopt “[a] clearer line.”58 The majority
did not accept Justice Breyer’s suggestion and steered clear of
answering the employee-officer question.59 In fact, the majority
specifically stated that the Court’s holding “does not address that
subset of independent agency employees who serve as
administrative law judges.”60 Therefore, Free Enterprise Fund left
lower courts with little more than a refusal to establish a clearer
employee-officer line.
Id.
See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he [Freytag] Court
laid exceptional stress on the STJs’ final decisionmaking power.”).
52 See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he . . . discretion
involved in the [settlement officer’s] decisions seem well below the level necessary to require
an ‘Officer.’”).
53 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
54 Id. at 506.
55 Id. at 510 (citing Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (“Whether one
is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.”)).
56 Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 539, 544.
59 Id. at 508.
60 Id. at 507 n.10.
50
51
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B. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
JURISPRUDENCE

Understandably, lower courts have disagreed as to how the
“significant authority” test should be applied. A circuit split
developed in 2016 regarding whether the SEC ALJs are officers or
mere employees.
Before its 2016 SEC decision, the D.C. Circuit decided in Landry
v. FDIC that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
ALJs are not officers, and are instead employees.61 The D.C. Circuit
went through Freytag’s factors, including the “established by Law”
provision, which it dubbed the “threshold trigger for the
Appointments Clause.”62 The D.C. Circuit also interpreted the
Freytag opinion as placing “exceptional stress” on the STJs’ power
to issue final decisions in holding that they were officers.63 The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that because the ALJs at issue do not possess final
decision-making powers, they are not inferior officers.64 Judge
Randolph, concurring in the judgment, disagreed with the
majority’s interpretation of Freytag.65 He criticized the majority’s
emphasis on the power of final decision-making, explaining that
while the Freytag court did rely on the finality consideration, “the
Court clearly designated this as an alternative holding.”66 Judge
Randolph instead found the ALJs to be indistinguishable from the
STJs in Freytag because both positions were “established by Law,”
performed similar duties, and “exercise[d] significant discretion.”67
The D.C. Circuit affirmed this position sixteen years later when
it held that ALJs working for the SEC are employees, not officers.68
The D.C. Circuit vacated its decision and granted a rehearing en
banc in early 2017.69 But after briefings and oral argument, the en
banc court was equally divided and thus affirmed its position that
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1133.
63 Id. at 1134.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1140 (Randolph, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 1142.
67 Id. at 1141.
68 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and reh’g en
banc granted, No. 15-1345, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), appeal denied, 868 F.3d
1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
69 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017),
vacating and granting reh’g en banc, 832 F.3d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2016), appeal denied, 868
F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
61
62
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the SEC ALJs are mere employees.70 In July 2017, Lucia filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.71 In its November 2017
brief to the Supreme Court, the SEC surprisingly changed its
position, stating that “the government is now of the view that such
ALJs are officers because they exercise ‘significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States.’”72 The SEC encouraged
the Court to review the case because of “pervasive uncertainty over
the scope of th[e] Court’s holding in Freytag” among the courts of
appeals.73 The Supreme Court granted Lucia’s petition for
certiorari, and decided on June 21, 2018 that SEC ALJs are, indeed,
inferior officers who must be appointed according to the
Appointments Clause—reversing the D.C. Circuit’s en banc
decision.74
In 2016, the Tenth Circuit openly disagreed with the D.C.
Circuit’s holding and held in Bandimere v. SEC that the SEC ALJs
are inferior officers.75 The Tenth Circuit rejected the D.C. Circuit’s
reliance on final decision-making power in Landry and Lucia,76 and
reasoned that the ALJs are officers because, like the STJs in
Freytag, their positions are “established by Law,” their duties,
salaries, and appointment are established by statute, and they
exercise “significant discretion in performing important
functions.”77 The Bandimere court laid out a table listing twentytwo of the SEC ALJs’ duties, including “[e]nter[ing] default
judgment . . . issu[ing] protective orders . . . [r]egulat[ing] the course
of the hearing . . . [and] [t]ak[ing] depositions,”78 and examined
these duties in light of Freytag to conclude that the SEC ALJs are
officers.79

70 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), denying appeal
from 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
71 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130).
72 Brief for Respondent at 10, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam)).
73 Id.
74 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055–56 (2018).
75 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706
(2018).
76 Id. at 1182.
77 Id. at 1179.
78 Id. at 1178.
79 Id. at 1179–81.
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The Fifth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in its
2017 Burgess v. FDIC decision.80 The Fifth Circuit decided that the
regulated party made a “strong showing” that the FDIC ALJs are
inferior officers, rather than employees.81 The Circuit said its
reading of Freytag dictated that the FDIC ALJs’ “lack of final
decision-making authority is not dispositive.”82 The Circuit
recognized the circuit split regarding the SEC ALJs,83 and its
decision implies that it might find the SEC ALJs to be inferior
officers as well.84
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia heard two cases in 2015 and decided in both that the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers.85 In both Gray Financial Group, Inc. v.
SEC and Hill v. SEC, the District Court held that “Freytag
mandates a finding that the SEC ALJs exercise ‘significant
authority’ and are thus inferior officers.”86 The SEC brought a
consolidated appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, and in 2016, the Circuit
vacated and remanded the cases with instructions to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.87
The Southern District of New York joined the Northern District
of Georgia in 2015 when it held that the SEC ALJs are inferior
officers in Duka v. SEC.88 The District Court quoted Hill
Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 300, 303.
82 Id. at 303.
83 Id. at 301.
84 See Thomas K. Potter, III, 5th Circuit Hints SEC ALJs Unconstitutional, BURR FORMAN
BLOGS (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.burr.com/blogs/securities-litigation/2017/09/13/5thcircuit-hints-sec-aljs-unconstitutional (“The opinion tips that the Fifth Circuit is likely to
align with Bandimere and reject the SEC’s customary reliance on Landry.”); see also Alison
Frankel, New 5th Circuit decision on ALJ constitutionality adds urgency to SCOTUS bid,
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-alj/new-5th-circuitdecision-on-alj-constitutionality-adds-urgency-to-scotus-bid-idUSKCN1BN2P2 (“The new
5th Circuit decision probably increases the odds that the Supreme Court will take up one or
both of the SEC ALJ cases.”).
85 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d
1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1353 (N.D. Ga.
2015), vacated, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
86 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319; Gray Fin. Grp., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1353.
87 Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016), vacating Hill v. SEC, 114 F.
Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015) and Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (N.D.
Ga. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the parties who filed suit in federal district
court against the SEC bypassed the review scheme set up by Congress in 15 U.S.C. § 78y,
and that the parties must first resolve their claims in the administrative forum. Id. at 1237.
88 Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 5547463, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2015); see also Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that the Court
80
81
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approvingly, holding that “Freytag mandates finding that the SEC
ALJs . . . are . . . inferior officers.”89 But like the Eleventh Circuit,
the Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the dismissal of a
challenge to the SEC ALJs on jurisdictional grounds in Tilton v.
SEC, holding that the plaintiffs had not exhausted the
administrative review process.90
C. LUCIA V. SEC

In June 2018, the Supreme Court resolved the SEC ALJ circuit
split but did almost nothing to provide further guidance to lower
courts regarding the employee-officer distinction. The Court
reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, and held that
the SEC ALJs are, in fact, officers of the United States.91 The Court
acknowledged outright that “maybe one day we will see a need to
refine or enhance the test Buckley set out so concisely,” but “that
day is not this one” because the Court’s analysis in Freytag
“necessarily decides this case.”92 Justice Kagan wrote for the
majority and reasoned that the SEC ALJs are “near-carbon copies”
of Freytag’s STJs in that the ALJs and STJs “have equivalent duties
and powers . . . in conducting adversarial inquiries” and “issue
decisions much like” one another.93
Because the Court relied almost completely on Freytag’s analysis
and added no clarification to the employee-officer test, its resolution
of the SEC ALJ circuit split does little to assist lower courts in
deciding the officer status of any other ALJs or AJs. Lower courts,
however, will inevitably need the guidance that the Supreme Court
eschewed in Lucia. While courts have yet to encounter challenges to
appointment procedures of AJs, Lucia’s holding that SEC ALJs are
officers is likely to spur such challenges.

had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276
(2d Cir. 2016).
89 Duka, 2015 WL 5547463, at *5 (quoting Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319).
90 824 F.3d at 276. See also Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632 (D. Md. 2015), aff’d, 844
F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2016) (dismissing challenge to appointment of SEC ALJs for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction).
91 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018), rev’g Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832
F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
92 Id. at 2052.
93 Id. at 2052–53.
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES BACKGROUND
With the Appointments Clause’s background and the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in mind, this section aims to explain AJs’ role
in the administrative sphere and their relationship to ALJs.
Within the federal administrative sphere, there are two general
categories of administrative adjudicators. First are ALJs, who
preside over formal hearings.94 When a statute specifies that an
agency hearing must occur “on the record,” it triggers formal
adjudication requirements, which include that an ALJ must
preside.95 As of March 2017, the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) reported employment of 1,931 ALJs.96 There is
little information regarding ALJs’ annual caseloads, but for the
fiscal year of October 1, 2016 to September 29, 2017, the U.S. Social
Security Administration (SSA) ALJs heard almost 684,000 cases.97
The SSA hears the vast majority of all ALJ cases across the federal
government, so the total number is likely not much larger than
this.98

Second are AJs, which this Note defines as non-ALJ administrative
adjudicators who oversee evidentiary hearings. When a statute does not
contain “on the record” language, an agency may use an AJ instead of
an ALJ for the hearing.99 The most recent study on AJs was conducted
in 2017, and it found that federal agencies employ at least 10,831 AJs.100
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57 (2012).
See id. § 554(a) (“This section applies . . . in every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record . . . .”); id. § 556(a) (“This section applies . . . to hearings
required by section . . . 554 of this title . . . .”); id. § 556(b)(3) (“There shall preside at the
taking of evidence . . . one or more administrative law judges . . . .”).
96 Administrative Law Judges by Agency, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (Mar.
2017), https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-byAgency.
97 Hearing Office Workload Data FY 2017, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. (Sept. 2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/archive/02_FY2017/02_September_HO_Workload_Da
ta.html (listing all SSA ALJ dispositions by location, added together equaling 683,735
dispositions).
98 See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1341, 1343–44 n.7 (1992) (estimating that ALJs heard “300,000 cases per year (with
the bulk of them (250,000) in the Social Security Administration)”). If SSA cases continue to
constitute 83% of all ALJ cases, then ALJs would have heard almost 824,000 cases total in
the October 2016 to 2017 fiscal year. See supra note 97 (SSA ALJs heard 683,735 cases in the
October 2016 to 2017 fiscal year).
99 But see Verkuil, supra note 98, at 1348 (noting that the SSA uses ALJs even though not
required to do so).
100 See Barnett et al., supra note 5, at 2.
94
95
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This is a 321% increase in the number of AJ positions from the last
reported study in 2002.101 There is not much recent data on AJs’ annual
caseloads, but a 2002 study reported that AJs heard 556,000 cases per
year.102 That number is likely much higher today; if the workload per
judge remains approximately the same as it was in 1992 and 2002, the
number of cases heard annually by AJs would now be between
1,300,000 and 1,700,000.103 Administrative adjudicators as a whole
have been referred to as the “hidden judiciary,” but some scholars
suggest that AJs “may be the real hidden judiciary.”104 This seems an
apt description, given their overshadowing of ALJs in both numbers and
caseloads, but general obscurity in scholarly and policymaking
decisions.

101 See RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY, THEN AND NOW: A DECADE OF CHANGE, 1992–2002 at 3 (2002) (reporting 3,370
AJs); see also John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal
Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 349 (1992) (reporting 2,692 AJs).
102 LIMON, supra note 101, at 3.
103 See Frye, supra note 101, at 264, 349 (reporting 2,692 AJs and 343,200 cases per year);
LIMON, supra note 101, at 3 (reporting 3,370 AJs and 556,000 cases per year). For 1992, those
numbers average to 127 cases per judge per year. For 2002, the numbers average to 165 cases
per judge per year. With 10,831 judges today, using those two averages and the same ratio of
cases to judge, there would be 1,300,000 to 1,700,00 cases per year. If the ratio of cases to
judge has increased over time (127 in 1992 to 165 in 2002; but two data points are not a strong
basis for detecting a trend), then there might now be over 1,700,000 cases decided by AJs per
year.
104 Verkuil, supra note 98, at 1345 (citations omitted).
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Figure 1. Administrative Adjudicators

Administrative Adjudicators
1,931
15%

10,831
85%
ALJs

AJs

While ALJs as a class enjoy protections from agency agendas,
AJs as a class have fewer protections on several important fronts.
First, ALJs are chosen through “an elaborate selection system” run
by the OPM.105 AJs, on the other hand, are selected and appointed
by the agencies themselves.106 Second, once ALJs are appointed,
they are statutorily protected from removal unless the agency has
good cause.107 AJs enjoy no such statutory removal protection.108
Third, Congress and the OPM preserve ALJs’ independence by
protecting them from performance reviews.109 However, almost all
AJs are subject to performance appraisals and are eligible for
bonuses from agencies.110

Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1347.
107 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
108 See Barnett, supra note 4, at 1661 (“[U]nlike ALJs, AJs are not entitled to any particular
protection from removal from office . . . .”).
109 Id. at 1655–56 (noting that ALJ pay is not tied to performance reviews and that agencies
cannot give ALJs bonuses).
110 See Barnett et al., supra note 5, at 73, 77 (reporting that 99% of AJs are subject to
performance appraisals and 90% of AJs are eligible for bonuses).
105
106
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IV. ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has failed to create a workable standard for
distinguishing between officers and employees. It should use a
bright-line test to determine the status of AJs. Lower courts’ and
scholars’ attempts to apply the Court’s jurisprudence have resulted
in a circuit split.111 The Court needs a bright-line test, and the
current “significant authority” test is likely underinclusive based on
the Framers’ intent.112 The test for whether AJs are inferior officers
or employees should be whether their positions are “established by
Law.”
A. THE COURTS NEED A CLEARER RULE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

The text of Article II itself does little to help courts distinguish
between officers and employees. The Supreme Court has struggled
to create clear tests distinguishing between principal officers and
inferior officers, and between inferior officers and employees.113 For
the latter distinction, the Court has looked to factors ranging from
whether the individual was appointed constitutionally,114 to
whether Congress established the position and duties by law,115
tenure and duration of the position,116 the exercise of significant
authority,117 discretion,118 and finality.119
See supra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
113 See supra Part II.A.
114 See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878) (reasoning that because an
individual was appointed by a department head, “he was, therefore, an officer of the United
States”); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920) (“Whether the incumbent is an
officer or an employee is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically
provided for . . . their . . . appointment . . . .”).
115 See, e.g., Burnap, 252 U.S. at 516 (stating that whether one is an officer also depends
upon whether Congress created the position and duties); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868,
881 (1991) (finding it significant that “[t]he office of special trial judge is ‘established by
Law’”).
116 See, e.g., Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512 (holding an individual not to be an officer because
his duties “are not continuing and permanent, and they are occasional and intermittent”).
117 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (“[A]ny appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the
United States’ . . . .”).
118 See, e.g., Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (finding it important that “[i]n the course of carrying
out these important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant discretion”).
119 See id. at 881 (holding STJs are officers despite the fact that they lack authority to enter
a final decision).
111
112
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Although the Supreme Court resolved the SEC ALJ circuit split
in Lucia v. SEC, it candidly refused to “refine or enhance” the
“significant authority” test.120 Thus, lower courts still lack guidance
on the status of AJs.
Recognizing the dissonance in Appointments Clause
jurisprudence, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) issued an opinion in April of 2007 that defines “a position,
however labeled,” as a federal office “if (1) it is invested by legal
authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal
government, and (2) it is ‘continuing.’”121 The OLC opined that
“delegated sovereign authority,” the first element, could be defined
as “power lawfully conferred by the government to bind third
parties, or the government itself, for the public benefit.”122 This
power to bind third parties has not been directly articulated by the
Court, and it is unclear whether that power is, indeed, important to
determine whether an individual is an officer. The OLC seems to
have extrapolated this definition of “delegated sovereign authority”
from several Supreme Court opinions and historical documents,123
but requiring officers to have the power to bind third parties would
likely be underinclusive, just as the “significant authority” test is.124
Scholars, too, have tried to make sense of the Court’s
jurisprudence by applying it to various positions. Most scholars
attempt to work within the Court’s articulated “significant
authority” test, which generally results in a subjective
interpretation of a hodge-podge of factors. For example, Professor
John Duffy asked whether administrative patent judges—a kind of
AJ—were officers subject to the Appointments Clause.125 He looked
120 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2018) (“[M]aybe one day we will see a need to
refine or enhance the test Buckley set out so concisely. But that day is not this one . . . .”).
121 Bradbury, supra note 33, at 73–74.
122 Id. at 87.
123 Id.
124 See infra Part IV.B. The OLC’s definition also creates some tension with the
subordination theory the Court has put forward to distinguish between principal and inferior
officers. See supra text accompanying note 23.
125 John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 904, 905 (2009); see also Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An
Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 234 (2008) (arguing bankruptcy
judges are principal officers, not inferior officers, and are appointed unconstitutionally);
Michael W. McConnell, The Pay Czar Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2009),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703574604574499953992328762 (arguing
that Kenneth Feinberg (Special Master for TARP Compensation) is an officer rather than
employee and is appointed unconstitutionally).
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to whether their offices were “established by Law,” whether they
had “more than ministerial duties” under the relevant statute,
whether they could issue final decisions, whether their decisions
received deference, and whether they had “substantial authority” or
were “mere ‘alter ego[s] or agent[s]’” of their superiors.126 Professor
Stacy Lindstedt expanded upon Duffy’s constitutional questioning
but criticized the “established by Law” factor because it is “subject
to congressional manipulation.”127 This Note refutes that
criticism.128
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE IS LIKELY
UNDERINCLUSIVE

The Court’s “significant authority” test is likely underinclusive
based on the Framers’ intent. In a recent article, Professor Jennifer
Mascott attempts to divine what the Framers intended by “Officers
of the United States” in the Appointments Clause.129 Mascott uses
“corpus linguistics-style analysis of Founding-era documents” and
“examines appointment practices during the First Congress
following constitutional ratification.”130 Based on this analysis,
Mascott concludes that the Framers intended for “officers” to
include many more positions than are included by case law today.131
She finds that the “most likely original public meaning of ‘officer’ is
one whom the government entrusts with ongoing responsibility to
perform a statutory duty of any level of importance.”132
If Mascott’s interpretation of the Founders’ intent is accurate,
there are good reasons to follow what the Framers intended
“officers” to mean. A broader inclusion of officers subject to the
Appointments Clause preserves a system of checks and balances.
By forcing more individuals to be appointed by one of the two
Duffy, supra note 125, at 907–08.
Lindstedt, supra note 18, at 1173 (“Congress could fail to provide for formal
appointment although it intends to delegate significant authority. Thus,
Tucker's established-by-law analysis gives Congress a blueprint to avoid the Appointments
Clause – create what would otherwise be an office by assigning significant authority to a
preexisting nonofficer and add the words ‘or employee’ to destroy any presumption of officer
status.” (footnote omitted) (referring to Tucker v. Comm’r , 135 T.C. 114 (2010), aff’d, 676
F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012))).
128 See infra Part IV.C.
129 Mascott, supra note 8, at 443.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
126
127
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mechanisms provided by the Appointments Clause, the Clause’s
purpose of ensuring that those who wield the power to appoint are
“accountable to political force and the will of the people”133 is well
served. If the President, courts of law, or heads of departments must
appoint more individuals to their positions, it is easier to trace the
chains of command and thus hold appointers and the appointed
accountable for their actions. In short, the Framers’ intended broad
definition of officers was well-reasoned because it ensured that
“nominators may not act under the cloak of secrecy.”134
However helpful Mascott’s analysis is to gain insight into the
Framers’ intent, her employee-officer conclusion is problematic. She
suggests that even if Congress only establishes duties “by law,” then
Congress has created an office; in other words, the person who
performs any statutorily-created duty qualifies as an officer.135 But
this assumption—that an office can exist simply by virtue of
Congress’s describing duties—contravenes the text of the
Appointments Clause itself. The Clause says: “all other Officers of
the United States . . . which shall be established by Law.”136 The
Clause does not provide that the duties of officers are “established
by Law,” but instead says that the “Officers” are “established by
Law.”137 Allowing an office to exist solely by statutory establishment
of duties would be overinclusive. It is possible that no government
actor would be an employee under Mascott’s analysis; it is hard to
imagine how one could act in furtherance of some governmental
mission without at least some statutory basis, no matter how
general. Mascott’s analysis is instructive as to the Framers’ intent,
but must be reconciled with the text itself.
C. THE TEST FOR WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IS AN
OFFICER SHOULD BE WHETHER HER POSITION IS “ESTABLISHED BY
LAW”

If an AJ’s position is “established by Law,” then the AJ should be
considered an officer for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.
This is so for two reasons. First, “established by Law” is the most
133 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129–
31 (1976)).
134 Mascott, supra note 8, at 107 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 398–99 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob Gideon Ed., 2001)).
135 Id. at 59, 95 n.609.
136 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
137 Id.
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important of the articulated indicators of officer status. Second, it
provides a workable bright line for courts and agencies to apply.
First, the “established by Law” provision is the most important
indicator of officer status. The text of the Appointments Clause says
that Congress may vest in the President alone, the courts, or heads
of departments the power to appoint inferior officers “whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law.”138 This mechanism for appointment,
often referred to as the Excepting Clause,139 provides a way to
appoint inferior officers that does not involve presidential
nomination with senatorial advice and consent, as is required for
principal officers.140
“[E]stablished by Law” is the only factor for officer status the
Court has articulated that is derived from the text of the
Constitution itself. Courts have recognized that whether a position
is “established by Law” is the “threshold” for officer status.141 If
there is a clear threshold for officer status, and there is an
advantage to an overinclusive as opposed to underinclusive
definition of officers for the purposes of the Appointments Clause,142
then the “significant authority” test is unnecessary for AJs. The
“established by Law” test instead provides a way to distinguish
between employees and inferior officers without allowing relatively
trivial matters, such as discretion, finality, and continuity, to make
the distinction.
Second, the “established by Law” test is a workable, bright-line
test that courts and agencies can apply. The current “significant
authority” test gave rise to a circuit split regarding officer status of
ALJs,143 which indicates that courts, agencies, and Congress are
unable to easily determine whether ALJs or AJs are appointed
constitutionally. Implementing the “established by Law” test would
be relatively simple compared to implementing the current test.
Anyone with basic legal researching skills could look to see if an
Id.
See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (referring to “[t]he authority
of Congress given by the excepting clause to vest the appointment of . . . inferior officers in
the heads of departments . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 127 (“The phrase ‘But
Congress may by law vest’ is equivalent to ‘excepting that Congress may by law vest.’”).
140 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
141 See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The office of STJ was
‘established by Law’ (the threshold trigger for the Appointments Clause) . . . .”).
142 See supra Part IV.B.
143 See supra Part II.B.
138
139
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AJ’s position was established via congressional statute and thus
determine whether the AJ is an officer. This is good for agencies
because it gives them notice as to which AJs need to be appointed
according to the Appointments Clause.
The “established by Law” test may work for other similar
positions, but this Note focuses on AJs because the AJ category
covers numerous agency positions, and all AJs have essentially the
same duties. Although this Note is highly skeptical of the
“significant authority” inquiry, this argument does not require its
outright rejection for all officials. It is enough to say that first, AJs’
duties are similar to ALJs’ as they both oversee oral evidentiary
hearings,144 and second, that litigation regarding the SEC ALJs has
resulted in examination of the minutiae of ALJs’ duties.145 A hardand-fast rule for AJs provides a more efficient way of handling their
officer status.
While possible circumvention of the Appointments Clause’s
requirements poses a threat under the “established by Law” test,
the need for clarity outweighs this concern. The threat here is not
that one branch will create and fill an office, but instead that the
legislative branch will purposefully fail to establish a position by
statute and thus circumvent the Appointments Clause.146 Although
this is a concern, Congress’s failure to establish a position by law
would not then allow Congress to fill the position; this is not the
concern of “encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other” that motivated the Framers to limit how and
who is appointed.147 Under the “established by Law” test, if
Congress wanted to ensure the Executive alone does not create and
fill a position, it could establish the position “by Law” and thus

144 See Barnett, supra note 4, at 1647 (“ALJs and AJs perform the same function: they
preside over oral hearings to award benefits and licenses, enforce agency penalties, and
adjudicate claims primarily between private parties. Indeed, some agencies use both ALJs
and AJs to hear the exact same kinds of cases . . . .”); Michael Asimow, The Administrative
Judiciary: ALJ’s in Historical Perspective, 9 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 25, 25 n.2
(1999) (referring to both ALJs and administrative judges as “lawyers who serve as . . . fulltime administrative trial judges”).
145 See, e.g., Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1177–78 (10th Cir. 2016) (laying out a table
of twenty-two examples of the SEC ALJs’ duties).
146 See Lindstedt, supra note 18, at 1173 (“Congress could fail to provide for formal
appointment although it intends to delegate significant authority. Thus, [the] established-bylaw analysis gives Congress a blueprint to avoid the Appointments Clause . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
147 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); see supra Part II.
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distribute the power of appointment between the Executive and
Legislative Branches. This seems to allow for the kind of balance
between the Executive and Legislature that the Appointments
Clause was meant to foster.148
D. EXAMPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AN “ESTABLISHED BY LAW
TEST” FOR ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES

Under the “established by Law” test, not all AJs will be officers.
Those AJs whose positions Congress establishes via statute are
“established by Law” and would thus be officers under this test. 149
Those AJs whose positions are not set up by statute or are
established only by regulation are not “established by Law” in the
relevant sense, and would be mere employees under this test. For
example, immigration judges are officers; the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) AJs are mere employees; and
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) adjudicators are officers. This Note
will examine these AJs in turn through the lens of the “established
by Law” test.
First, immigration judges are officers under the “established by
Law” test. Congress established these positions via statute by
providing that “[a]n immigration judge shall conduct proceedings
for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”150
Congress further defines an immigration judges as an “attorney
whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge
within the Executive Office for Immigration Review.”151 The lack of
148 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991) (“[T]he [Appointments] Clause
bespeaks a principle of limitation by dividing the power to appoint the principal federal
officers—ambassadors, ministers, heads of departments, and judges—between the Executive
and Legislative Branches.” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129–31)).
149 Positions “established by Law” should not include those established via regulation
because regulations are not promulgated by Congress.
150 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).
151 Id. § 1101(b)(4). Congress also establishes the duties of the Immigration Judge, but
under the “established by Law” test, only the position, not the duties, are established by law.
See id. § 1229(b)(1) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses. The immigration judge
may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence. The
immigration judge shall have authority . . . to sanction by civil money penalty any action (or
inaction) in contempt of the judge's proper exercise of authority . . . .”). These duties seem
more than enough to satisfy the “significant authority” test. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868, 881–82 (1991) (holding STJs exercise significant authority because they perform “more
than ministerial tasks,” and instead “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility
of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders”).
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“on the record” language and the explicit naming of immigration
judges as “administrative judges” together show that they are AJs
instead of ALJs. Congress has provided via statute for the office of
an immigration judge, and thus under the “established by Law” test,
immigration judges are officers of the United States.
In contrast, the EEOC AJs are mere employees under the
“established by Law” test. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
“[f]or the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted by
the Commission or its duly authorized agents or agencies, section
161 of title 29 shall apply.”152 That section provides that “[t]he
Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies” shall conduct
hearings.153 Neither statute contains “on the record” language,154 so
the proceedings are allowed to be informal. Since neither statute
establishes the office of the EEOC AJ, these adjudicators are mere
employees under the “established by Law” test.
Finally, IRS hearing officers are officers under the “established
by Law” test. Congress provides that IRS hearings shall be
conducted “by an officer or employee who has had no prior
involvement.”155 By using the phrase “an officer,” Congress has
established an office “by Law,” and thus, the person who conducts
IRS hearings is an officer. The statute also includes no “on the
record” language to trigger formal adjudication, so the IRS hearings
are informal. Because IRS hearing officers are AJs who are
“established by Law,” they are officers under this Note’s proposed
test.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note proposes a rule-based approach to determining
whether AJs qualify as officers under the Appointments Clause. The
test is simple; if an AJ is “established by Law,” then that AJ is an
officer. This test is preferable to the “significant authority” test the
Court has espoused, which has created discord among the lower
courts, because it better serves the purposes of the Appointments
Clause and is more easily applicable.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (2012).
154 See id. (not containing “on the record” language); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (2012) (containing
no “on the record” language).
155 26 U.S.C. § 6320(b)(3) (2012). Under the “established by Law” test, the “or employee”
language in this statute is fluff—it has no effect on the creation of an office.
152
153
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Applying the “established by Law” test to AJs mandates finding
that many AJs are officers. This could be a serious problem for
agencies given the huge number of AJs in the United States
today.156 For those AJs who have been appointed unconstitutionally,
agencies must work to remedy their appointments and determine
which actions, if any, should be afforded de facto validity. 157
However, the need for clarity regarding this important clause of the
Constitution requires a bright line, and the “established by Law”
test is the best line for AJs.

See supra Part III.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam) (granting de facto validity to
the past actions of the unconstitutionally appointed officers).
156
157
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